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ESSAY
ERIE AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
Jack Goldsmith* and Steven Walt"*O F the many things that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' is
famous for, two stand out. The first is its jurisprudential
commitment to legal positivism. The second is its holding that the
common law powers of federal courts exercised in Swift v. Tyson2
are unconstitutional. Erie suggests that there is a connection be-
tween its jurisprudential commitment and its constitutional hold-
ing. The language of the opinion intimates that the constitutional
holding follows from the jurisprudential commitment. It says that
the rule of Swift rests on a "fallacy."3 The fallacy is a belief that
there is a "transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute."4
This belief is fallacious, the opinion continues, because "law in the
sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it."5 The "sense" described is Austin's
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304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
3 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
4 Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For comment on the rhetorical attribution of fallacies to others, see
William K. Frankena, The Naturalistic Fallacy, in Perspectives on Morality: Essays by
William K. Frankena I (K.E. Goodpaster ed., 1976) ("The future historian of 'thought
and expression' in the twentieth century will no doubt record with some amusement
the ingenious trick, which some of the philosophical controversialists of the first quar-
ter of our century had, of labeling their opponents' views 'fallacies."').
IErie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J.,
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legal positivist conception of the nature of law. After elaborating
the point, the opinion concludes: "Thus the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson is... 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of
the United States ...,,6 Recognize that the correct conception of
law is legal positivism, Erie appears to say, and Swift's unconsti-
tutionality follows. Erie thus asserts that a jurisprudential com-
mitment to legal positivism has constitutional consequences.
Most commentators agree. In different and sometimes contra-
dictory ways, they believe that Erie's constitutional holding relies
on a commitment to legal positivism.7 Our aim in this Essay is to
analyze and challenge this conventional wisdom. Commentators
sometimes state the conventional wisdom in causal terms as a his-
torical connection between beliefs about positivism and Erie's
overruling of Swift. We think this historical claim lacks affirmative
support, overlooks significant evidence to the contrary, and mis-
leadingly views Erie's pre-history through the distorting lens of
Holmes's anti-Swift dissents.8  Some commentators also contend
that there is a conceptual or normative connection between the
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Id. (emphasis added).
IFor a sample of the claimed reliance among commentators, see Patrick J.
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a
Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 79, 115-16 (1993); William R.
Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 Tul. L.
Rev. 907, 907-08 (1988); Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several
States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459, 1462
(1997); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev.
263, 283 (1992); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context
in Interpretive Theory, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1789-95 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig,
Erie-Effects]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and The-
ory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 426-38 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings]; William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Critical Evaluation, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1372, 1391-92 (1989); Burt Neuborne, The
Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 991, 998 (1987);
George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positiv-
ism, 10 Const. Commentary 285, 285 (1993); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common
Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 819-21 (1989); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Con-
flict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1743, 1760 (1992); cf. Tony Freyer,
Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases in American Federalism 101 (1981)
("Erie reflected jurisprudential assumptions .... "). For judicial support for the
claimed reliance, in addition to some of the language in the opinion in Erie, see
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (Erie "overruled a particular
way of looking at law.").
8 See infra Part II.
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truth of positivism and Erie's holding. We think these contentions
too are wrong.9 Our claim here is one of irrelevance: Erie's com-
mitment to legal positivism is conceptually and normatively inde-
pendent of its constitutional holding. Legal positivism is a general
theory about the nature of law. Even if true, it has no implications
for the allocation of authority between the state and federal gov-
ernments.
Our argument informs the seemingly endless debate about Erie
and its consequences in a variety of ways." It shows that Erie is not
a decision about the nature of law, but rather reflects a particular
time-bound set of constitutional and policy priorities. It helps to
explain why some recent philosophical attacks on Erie are
groundless. The argument demonstrates that the many outstanding
mysteries about the practical implications of Erie's holding cannot,
as many think, be resolved by recourse to legal positivism. And it
presents a cautionary lesson about the dangers of attempting to de-
rive constitutional conclusions from theories about law.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I clarifies the terms and
content of our claims. Part II questions the strength of the histori-
cal connection between legal positivism and Erie. Part III argues
that legal positivism is conceptually irrelevant to Erie's holding.
Part IV argues that it is normatively irrelevant. Part V illustrates
several implications of rejecting legal positivism's relevance to
Erie. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THESIS
There are at least three possible connections between legal
positivism and Erie's holding: historical, conceptual, and norma-
tive. The historical connection concerns the historical relationship
between the acceptance of legal positivism in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and the constitutional holding in Erie. It
makes an assertion of historical causation. For example, the his-
torical connection would include the claim that Brandeis and
company believed that legal positivism required the Erie holding
or made it more acceptable. The conceptual connection is that le-
gal positivism is necessary in some way to the result in Erie. For
See infra Parts III, IV.
10 See infra Part V.
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instance, a conceptual connection might treat the truth of legal
positivism as an indispensable premise in an argument whose con-
clusion is Erie's holding. The normative connection holds that the
result in Erie is justified, supported, or given additional authority
by the truth of legal positivism. It would include the contention
that the truth of legal positivism is a good reason for Erie's holding.
The relevant historical, conceptual, and normative connections
state very different kinds of associations.
Commentators asserting a connection between legal positivism
and Erie's holding do not specify the kind of connection they have
in mind." Their assertions are often made casually and without
precision. We are less concerned with demonstrating who asserts
which connection than in showing that the connections asserted are
all problematic. In particular, we argue for two claims. First, the
historical connection lacks support. It is based on a paucity of
misleading evidence, and overlooks considerable countervailing
evidence that suggests legal positivism had no causal significance
for Erie. We do not argue that the historical connection is wrong.
We only contend that its proponents have not shown there to be a
causal connection, and that the weight of the historical evidence
strongly suggests none exists. Second, we claim that there are no
conceptual or normative connections between legal positivism and
Erie's holding. The claim here is one of irrelevance: Legal positiv-
ism is conceptually and normatively irrelevant to Erie's holding.
To clarify these claims, we begin by clarifying terms. Start with
Erie's holding. The holding has been subject to disagreement and
controversy over the years. Some commentators thought that Erie
held that the federal courts had no power to make general federal
common law because such power exceeded the lawmaking power
11 For example, Lessig's prominent recent arguments about a relationship between
legal positivism and Erie arguably assert all three connections. Sometimes he sug-
gests that the connection is historical, see Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings,
supra note 7, at 432 ("Premised upon a change in philosophy and upon its effect on a
legal culture, the Court declared a practice with a ninety-six year pedigree unconsti-
tutional."), sometimes he suggests it is conceptual, see id. at 431 ("Change one idea in
philosophy, transform in some small way a bit of legal language, and this century-old
doctrine of Swift quickly falls away."), and sometimes he suggests that it is normative,
see Lessig, Erie-Effects, supra note 7, at 1794 ("'Positivism' and 'realism' became
ways of organizing opposition to a practice that was no longer the benign delegation
of Swift. Together they rendered contestable the role of federal courts in this articu-
lation of the common law.") (footnotes omitted).
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of the entire federal government, including Congress.12 This broad
reading of Erie's holding finds modest support in the opinion. 3
Whatever its validity as an original matter,"4 the broad reading was
rendered unimportant by the expansion of congressional lawmak-
ing power since 1938. But in place of the broad reading still
stands Erie's narrower holding that federal courts have no inde-
pendent lawmaking powers: "Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State."16 The narrower holding is con-
sistent with the large body of post-Erie "specialized" federal com-
mon law that finds its ultimate authorization in the Constitution or
in an act of Congress. This "specialized" federal common law, un-
like Swift-ian general federal common law, has the force of federal
law within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause. 7 When we refer
to "Erie's holding" we shall mean the narrower reading.
Consider next legal positivism. Legal positivism is a thesis about
the nature of law. It is a view about what makes a norm a legal
norm. Natural law and related theories, in their simple forms, hold
that law depends on conformity to moral principle. 8 Positivism, by
1 Benno Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by the Federal Courts-Effect of Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 512, 520-24 (1938); Recent Cases, 22 Minn. L.
Rev. 876, 887 (1938); Recent Decisions, 7 Fordham L. Rev. 436,440-41 (1938).
13304 U.S. at 78 ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts.").
"4 Chief Justice Stone, who joined Brandeis's opinion, did not read Erie so broadly.
In a letter to Frankfurter soon after the decision Stone remarked:
Beyond [federal courts' unconstitutional assumption of powers] it was unneces-
sary to go. I should have liked to have said that, and that it was unnecessary to
say how far or to what extent Congress might legislate, but I thought enough
was written without my risking the final result by putting in my oar.
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 480-81 (1956) (quoting
Letter from Harlan Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 29, 1938)). Later, Stone wrote:
"'[I] do not think it is at all clear that Congress could not apply (enact) substantive
rules to be applied by federal courts. I think that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins did
not settle that question, notwithstanding some unfortunate dicta in the opinion."' Id.
at 480 (quoting Letter from Harlan Stone to Owen J. Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941)).
1- See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1, 14-16 (1985); Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 288.
16304 U.S. at 78.
17 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383,407 (1964).
18 For recent versions of the position, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights (1980); Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 165
1998] 677
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contrast, holds that law depends on social practices of one sort or
another. Versions of legal positivism differ according to the fea-
tures of social practices made central to the thesis or to the extent
of law's dependence on social practices. Erie, following Holmes's
earlier dissents, adopted an unexceptional Austinian version of le-
gal positivism. Law, according to Austin, is the coercive order of a
sovereign. 9 In his dissent in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., ' Holmes added the
realist gloss that state court decisions count as law.2' Brandeis's
opinion in Erie, by quoting approvingly the pertinent part of Hol-
mes's dissent, adopts both an Austinian version of legal positivism
and Holmes's realist gloss on it.
Austinian, positivism maintains a relatively narrow conception of
the type of social practice on which law depends. Modem formula-
tions of legal positivism broaden this conception. These modem
formulations divide between what are called "hard" and "soft"
positivist positions. "Hard" positivism makes the existence and
content of law depend only on social practices; "soft" positivism
allows the identification of law to depend on matters independent
of social practices as well. For instance, unlike "hard" positivism,
"soft" positivism allows the possibility that the identification of
law depends to some extent on conformity with substantive moral
principles. Hartian positivism, a version of "soft" legal positivism,
considers the convergent behavior of the relevant officials as cen-
tral: a social practice that specifies the conditions that must be sat-
isfied for a norm to be law in the community. ' Because the social
(1982); Neil MacCormick, Natural Law Reconsidered, 1 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 99
(1981); Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2424 (1992).
The arguments below apply to positions that require that law depends on features of
social practices and thus apply to versions of natural law that allow for dependence
on social practice. See Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing
Features of Legal Positivism, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 1,
1-29 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (suggesting that most modern natural law theories
are consistent with weak forms of legal positivism). The metaphilosophical question
of the importance of the difference between positivism and versions of natural law is
a separate issue, unaddressed in this Essay.
19 See John Austin, Lecture I, in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 18
(Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995). For a good historical summary of positivism, see An-
thony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2054 (1995).
2'276 U.S. 518 (1928).
21 Id. at 532-36 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994); Jules L. Coleman,
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practice can have recourse to substantive moral principles, the
identification of law need not depend only on features of a social
practice. Razian positivism, by contrast, takes (unspecified) social
facts to be exclusive: law depends only on its social source, not its
content or morality.' Raz's is a version of "hard" positivism.
To ease exposition, we shall identify legal positivism with "hard"
positivism. Hence, except where otherwise flagged, we take legal
positivism to be committed to the claim that law depends only on
features of a social practice or, more generally, social facts.
Throughout the analysis, however, we take care not to let the label
"legal positivism" obscure the appropriate, and often varying, un-
derlying substantive position at issue. For example, in connection
with the historical claim, our working definition of legal positivism
is somewhat anachronistic. Most positivists in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century understood positivism in its narrow,
Austinian version. Positions which based law on features of a so-
cial practice other than a sovereign's coercive orders were not con-
sidered positivist. So, for example, understanding law to rest on
the "life" of a community or its prevailing customs and practices
might not be seen to be a species of positivism.24 Worse, legal par-
ticipants who were not self-described positivists sometimes ac-
cepted positivism in everything but name.' The historical connec-
tion asserts that Austinian positivism with a Holmesian gloss, a
particular brand of hard legal positivism, influenced Erie's holding.
In assessing the validity of the historical connection, we analyze the
relationship between this understanding of hard legal positivism
and Erie.
Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1982); cf. WJ. Waluchow,
Inclusive Legal Positivism (1994) (describing commitments of soft or inclusive posi-
tivism).
21 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 47-48
(1979); Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in Ethics in the Public Domain:
Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 194, 194-221 (1994).
24 For example, the general common law applied by Swift was justified in the opin-
ion and by later commentators as a species of customary law, see, e.g., Lessig, Erie-
Effects, supra note 7, at 1789-92, but was nonetheless criticized by positivists because
it was not backed by a sovereign command, see Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at
534-35 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 The author of Swift, Joseph Story, is a possible example. See Herbert Hoven-
kamp, Federalism Revised, 34 Hastings LJ. 201, 224-25 (1982) (book review) ("[O]ne
must appreciate that Story himself had a positivistic view of the rule of law .... The
rule created by Swift v. Tyson was a rule of the United States as sovereign.").
1998] 679
Virginia Law Review
A word of caution is also in order about the relationship between
our operational definition of legal positivism as hard positivism
and our claim that legal positivism is conceptually and normatively
irrelevant to Erie's holding. Although we focus on hard positivism,
our claim that legal positivism is conceptually and normatively ir-
relevant to Erie's holding does not rely on any particular version of
legal positivism. It does not turn on whether law depends on con-
formity with substantive moral principles (Hart) or is constituted
exclusively by the coercive orders of a sovereign (Austin) or other
social facts (Raz). Our claim is that legal positivism in any of its
formulations is conceptually and normatively irrelevant to Erie's
holding.
Finally, we should clarify what we mean when we say that the
Constitution or constitutional considerations alone explain or
justify Erie's holding. By itself this claim begs questions about the
proper sources of constitutional interpretation. We have no need
to engage the perennial debate about whether, and to what extent,
text, history, structure, policy, and other factors inform con-
stitutional interpretation. Nor do we need to specify the precise
constitutional basis for Erie's holding, which is notoriously elu-
sive.' When we say that theories about the nature of law are ir-
relevant to Erie's holding and that constitutional considerations
alone matter, we mean simply to exclude theories about the nature
of law from the basket of considerations that inform Erie's consti-
tutional analysis.
II. HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS
Commentators put the historical connection between a belief in
legal positivism and Erie's holding in different ways. They claim
that legal positivism "led to" the Erie holding,' or was a "factor"
in, or "contributed" to, the holding in Erie,' or they describe Erie
as a product of positivist beliefs. Sometimes they claim the Court
26 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693
(1974); Kramer, supra note 7, at 263-65.
21 See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1391-92.
Is See Freyer, supra note 7, at 121-22; cf. id. at 96-97(discussing schools of thought
that helped to undermine the Swift doctrine).
29 See Borchers, supra note 7, at 115-16 ("[T]he change that finally brought about
Erie... was a revolution in legal philosophy.").
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would not have reached its result in Erie if it had not believed in
the truth of positivism." The phrases, although different, all de-
scribe the association as one of historical connection. It is proba-
bly impossible to demonstrate whether and to what extent con-
stitutional, policy, social, and other considerations besides legal
positivism caused the Court to adopt its holding in Erie. Our goal
is more modest and selective: to present evidence that casts seri-
ous doubt on the often-asserted and little-analyzed causal role of
legal positivism.
One problem with the historical connection is its lack of speci-
ficity. Commentators asserting the connection are unclear about
whether a belief in legal positivism is a cause, an important cause,
or merely a causal condition of the Court's decision in Erie. When
causal claims cannot be assessed by experimental replication or
manipulation of variables, they typically can be established in ei-
ther of two ways: by finding cases which are factually similar in all
respects but one, in which the outcome of the cases with the new
variable is different; or by reasoning counterfactually, asking what
would have occurred had an event not taken place. Establishing
causation requires care in specifying the similarity between cases
with different outcomes or the counterfactual being offered.31
Commentators urging a causal connection between belief in legal
positivism and Erie have provided neither the necessary similarity
among cases nor a specific counterfactual.
But this standard is probably too exacting. Intellectual histori-
ans often operate with a less demanding notion of causal support.
According to it, if a set of beliefs is held at the time an event occurs
and the justifications given for the event bear some trace of those
beliefs, a claimed causal connection between the beliefs and the
event is supported, at least provisionally.32 Under this standard,
'0 See Casto, supra note 7, at 911-12.
Cf. Edgar Kiser & Margaret Levi, Using Counterfactuals in Historical Analysis:
Theories of Revolution, in Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics:
Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives 187, 190 (Philip E. Tetlock
& Aaron Belkin eds., 1996) (arguing that the plausibility of causal claims rests on
quality of supporting counterfactuals); Peter D. McClelland, Causal Explanation and
Model Building in History, Economics, and the New Economic History 152-68 (1975)
(arguing that the assessment of causal importance depends on probabilistic counter-
factuals).
32 G.E. White has suggested to us this formulation of the standard. For a recent
1998]
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commentators present the following evidence in support of the
claimed historical connection between legal positivism and Erie's
holding.33 They begin with the view that Swift rested on a commit-
ment to some non-positivistic notion of natural law or, at the very
least, of law not tied to any particular sovereign authority. They
then point to the rise of legal positivism in the nineteenth century
and to late nineteenth and early twentieth century legal positivist
critiques of Swift.' Like Holmes, they suggest that legal positivism
undermined Swift's commitment to a preexisting, self-executing,
and objectively discoverable law, and revealed the federal court
practice of applying general law to be an unconstitutional intrusion
on state sovereignty. Finally, the commentators cite the language
in the Erie opinion itself that declared that Swift's anti-positivistic
approach was wrong and tied its constitutional holding to an em-
brace of Holmesian positivism.
Every step of this argument is questionable. It is doubtful that
Swift represented a commitment to or belief in the "brooding om-
nipresence" theory later attributed to it by Holmes and Erie.3'
Moreover, one is hard-pressed to find a subsequent defense or ex-
planation of Swift that embraces the "brooding omnipresence"
conception of law. Indeed, soon after Swift and throughout the
survey of general approaches to intellectual history, see William W. Fisher III, Texts
and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of
Intellectual History, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1065 (1997).
33 Two comprehensive accounts in recent times are Casto, supra note 7, at 921-48, and
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 7, at 426-38.
See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215
U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 399 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting); Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 29, 1926), in 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspon-
dence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935, at 815, 822-24 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953); William M. Meigs, Shall the State Courts Adopt the Fed-
eral Doctrine of "General Principles of Jurisprudence?", 29 Cent. LJ. 465,487 (1889).
35 See Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 33-35 (1977); Morton J. Honvitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 16-30, 245-52 (1977); Hoven-
kamp, supra note 25, at 224-25; cf. Lessig, Erie-Effects, supra note 7, at 1793 n.50
("Justice Holmes was consistently quite unfair to Swift, writing as if the doctrine he
was attacking was the doctrine that Swift had created. This is blaming the parent for
the sins of the child.") (citations omitted). One can criticize Holmes's description of
Swift without committing oneself to the broader and perhaps more questionable
claims made by Horwitz and others about the extent to which Americans had re-
jected the natural law and even customary law basis of the common law in the 1780-
1820 period. See Horwitz, supra.
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court and
commentators justified the Swift regime primarily on constitutional
grounds. 6 They consistently argued that Article III's purpose to
provide a neutral forum protecting nonresidents from discrimina-
tion justified Swift and its progeny.' Whatever one thinks of the
merits of this constitutional argument, it does not rest on a denial
of the truth of legal positivism.
More broadly, at the turn of the century, the practicing bar and
legal academy widely embraced legal positivism, usually in its
Austinian version." Indeed, Swift's many supporters in this period
can accurately be described as legal positivists. 9 Chamberlain ex-
pressly grounded his defense of Swift in the authority of Article
III.' He also emphasized that "no fascinating theories of natural
right and justice, nor brilliant philosophical speculations upon the
nature of society and government, but.., a profound knowledge
and appreciation of the familiar, home-bred, hard-won, slowly-
maturing results of... political life and experience" justified Swift
11 See Freyer, supra note 7, at 46, 53-56, 71-74.
-7 For Supreme Court decisions to this effect soon after Swift, see, e.g., Watson v.
Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 520-21 (1855); Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
134, 139 (1847). For decisions later in the century, see, e.g., Baugh, 149 U.S. at 371-
73; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34-38 (1883). For a sampling of this constitu-
tional defense of Swift among commentators, see Daniel H. Chamberlain, The State
Judiciary: Its Place in the American Constitutional System, in Constitutional History
of the United States as Seen in the Development of American Law 237, 274-82
(1889); Henry Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in
State and Federal Courts, 4 III. L. Rev. 533, 537-38 (1910). See generally Freyer, su-
pra note 7, at 45-100 (discussing the Supreme Court's incorporation of the Swift doc-
trine into constitutional theory).
'1 See Freyer, supra note 7, at 96-97; see also Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 3
(asserting that positivism was "strongly entrenched" in the United States from the
middle of the nineteenth century); cf. Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery
and the Judicial Process 8-30 (1975) (demonstrating the prevalence of legal positivism
in bench and bar in antebellum debates over slavery). See generally Stephen M.
Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Posi-
tivism, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1387 (1997) (summarizing and analyzing various accounts of
the rise of legal positivism in the nineteenth century).
11 As Freyer puts the point: "So pervasive were notions concerning the source of
law as either the command of the sovereign or community custom by the 1880s and
1890s, that it does not seem surprising that supporters and critics used them in their
analysis of the Swift principle." Freyer, supra note 7, at 97. Freyer adds that
"twentieth-century defenders of Swift v. Tyson used reasoning derived from legal
positivism, as did the critics of the doctrine." Id. at 152.
,1 Chamberlain, supra note 37, at 260-78.
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and its supporting constitutional and statutory apparatus. 4' Green,
Schofield, and Eliot all embraced legal positivism in the sense that
they rejected the notion of a third source of law not tied to state
and federal law.42 They argued nonetheless that Swift was essen-
tially correct in counseling courts to make an independent judg-
ment about the content of state law.43
Corbin later took a similar tack.' He agreed with Holmes's dis-
sent in Black & White Taxicab that there is "no 'transcendental
body of law,' no system of 'common law' outside of a particular
state," and that law must have "'definite authority behind it."' 45
But he thought that federal courts should draw on the same sources
as state courts in discerning what state law requires. ' For Corbin
these sources included "the state constitution and statutes, former
opinions of the state courts of every rank, opinions of the courts of
other states, the Restatements of the American Law Institute, the
works of juristic writers, [and] the mores and practices of the com-
munity,"' as well as "life history" and the "living stream of dispute
and conflict," otherwise known as the pattern of case outcomes and
standards immanent in it.' Corbin also pointed out that when a
41 Id. at 283.
41 Edward C. Eliot, The Common Law of the Federal Courts, 36 Am. L. Rev. 498
(1902); Frederick Green, The Law as Precedent, Prophecy, and Principle: State Deci-
sions in Federal Courts, 19 Ill. L. Rev. 217 (1924); Schofield, supra note 37.
43 Eliot, supra note 42, at 521-23; Green, supra note 42, at 218-25; Schofield, supra
note 37, at 538, 541, 543; see also Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 189-91 (1929) (making
similar point).
44 See Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American
Law Institute, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 25 (1929) [hereinafter Corbin, Restatement of the
Common Law]. Corbin also wrote two articles after Erie that exemplify a commit-
ment both to legal positivism and a defense of Swift. See Arthur L. Corbin, The
Common Law of the United States, 47 Yale LJ. 1351, 1351-53 (1938) [hereinafter
Corbin, The Common Law of the United States]; Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of The
Several States, 50 Yale L.J. 762, 764-65 (1941) [hereinafter Corbin, The Laws of the
Several States].
45 Corbin, Restatement of the Common Law, supra note 44, at 24-25; see also
Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 44, at 1351-52; Corbin,
The Laws of the Several States, supra note 44, at 763-65.
4 See Corbin, Restatement of the Common Law, supra note 44, at 24-26; see also
Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 44, at 1352-53; Corbin,
The Laws of the Several States, supra note 44, at 771.
47 Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, supra note 44, at 771.
41 Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, supra note 44, at 1352; see also
Corbin, Restatement of the Common Law, supra note 44, at 25.
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federal court exercises an independent judgment to "declare[] and
appl[y] the common law" of a particular state, the law so declared
and applied had the "definite authority behind it" of a federal
court. 9 Like Chamberlain, Green, and Schofield, Corbin both em-
braced legal positivism and defended Swift." Even the Swift sup-
porters, who believed the general common law applied by federal
courts was not a species of state law, thought that it was judge-
made, national common law authorized by the Constitution and
analogous to, with similar sources as, state common law.1 They too
were legal positivists.
It is, of course, also true that in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, some of the attacks on Swift were directed to its
ostensible embrace of an antipositivistic conception of law. Field's
dissent in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh52 attacked the
conception: "I cannot assent to the doctrine that there is an atmos-
phere of general law floating about all the States, not belonging to
any of them .... , Meigs identified as Swift's "essential fallacy"
its "assumption of the existence of [a] body of general principles,"
which are "nowhere to be found laid down with authority; no law-
giver has ever enacted them."' And of course Holmes later made
4) Corbin, Restatement of the Common Law, supra note 44, at 25.
Judge Parker is another example of someone who embraced legal positivism and
Swift. Parker read Swift's recognition of general common law to refer to the common
law of the state until changed by state statute. See Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502,
504 (4th Cir. 1934) (Parker, J.). His (oblique) defense of Swift is similar to Corbin's.
Parker grounded the authority of federal courts to exercise an independent judgment
about state common law in Article III. See Hewlett, 68 F.2d at 504; John J. Parker,
Erie v. Tompkins In Retrospect: An Analysis of its Proper Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A.
J. 19, 21 (1949). As to the nature of law, Parker acknowledged that it is "not 'a
brooding omnipresence in the sky."' Parker, supra, at 21. On the issue of how federal
courts are to determine state law, Parker thought that they were to use all data bear-
ing on state law, including decisions by state courts. See Hewlett, 68 F.2d at 504;
Parker, supra, at 20. So, to put the point anachronistically, Parker counts as a posi-
tivist who thought Erie wrongly decided.
11 See, e.g., Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 62 F. 24, 26-42 (C.C.N.D. Iowa
1894), aff'd, 92 F. 868 (8th Cir. 1899); Alton B. Parker, The Common Law Jurisdic-
tion of the United States Courts, 17 Yale L.J. 1 (1907); Percy Werner, National
Common Law: On the Introduction and Modification of the Common Law in the
United States, 8 S. L. Rev. 414 (1882).
149 U.S. 368 (1893).
Id. at 399 (Field, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 394 ("[T]here is no unwritten general or
common law of the United States on any subject.").
'
4 See Meigs, supra note 34; see also William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal
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similar points.55 None of these critics cites an example of Swift's
commitment to antipositivism, however. This raises doubts about
the accuracy of their characterization, especially since Swift's many
defenders so clearly embraced legal positivism. In addition, except
for Holmes, none of these critics made the "brooding omnipres-
ence" point central to their analysis. Instead, these and other late
nineteenth and early twentieth century critics of Swift developed
new constitutional arguments against the Swift regime.' They
countered the Article III and related arguments made in its sup-
port by arguing that Article III did not authorize the development
of general common law, and that constitutional structure affirma-
tively prohibited it. They also argued that vertical uniformity,
which protected state interests, was of greater constitutional value
than horizontal uniformity, which protected nonresidents. The con-
stitutional arguments were not tied to legal positivism.
Even Holmes made the connection between the truth of legal
positivism and a constitutional conclusion late in the day and la-
conically. His first positivist thrust at Swift in his Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co.' dissent raised constitutional objections (if at all) only
weakly and indirectly." He did not call for the overruling of Swift,
but rather asserted that his "reasoning... justifies" only that Swift
not be applied in cases that "by nature and necessity [are] pecu-
liarly local."59 In his early correspondence with Pollock and Laski
he attacked the "fallacy" of Swift but never tied this attack to a
Courts on Questions of State Law, 45 Am. L. Rev. 47, 56 (1911) ("There did not exist
in [Marshall's] day a general commercial law, apart from a sovereignty to create it,
floating in the air, intangible.").
5 See sources cited supra note 34.
16 In addition to Meigs's work and Field's dissent, early constitutional arguments
against Swift can be found in 1 J.I. Clark Hare, American Constitutional Law 1117
(1889); J.B. Heiskell, Conflict Between Federal and State Decisions, 16 Am. L. Rev.
743 (1882); William B. Hornblower, Conflict Between Federal and State Decisions,
14 Am. L. Rev. 211 (1880); William H. Rand, Jr., Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 328 (1895).
215 U.S. 349 (1910).
Holmes might have been alluding to a constitutional objection in his Kuhn dissent
when he stated that "I never yet have heard a statement of any reason justifying the
power [of federal courts applying general common law], and I find it hard to imagine
one." 215 U.S. at 371 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But see G. Edward White, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 389 (1993) (Holmes's "first mention
of a constitutional objection had come in the Taxicab case.... .
19 Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 372 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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constitutional conclusion.' When Holmes finally asserted in 1927
that the "fallacy has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of
powers,"'" he was obscure about the constitutional infirmity and
silent about the connection between this infirmity and the truth of
legal positivism. 2 In addition, he once again indicated, with little
explanation, that he would "leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed."'63
Finally, Holmes never addressed the then-widespread positivist ar-
gument that Article III authorized the Swift regime.
This analysis casts doubt on the historical connection between
legal positivism and Erie's holding. In the late nineteenth century
legal positivism was not considered a shocking thesis, and its advo-
cacy was small beer. The claimed historical connection fails to ex-
plain why there was a large temporal gap between the general ac-
ceptance of legal positivism and the decision in Erie. By itself, this
gap makes a causal role for positivism seem doubtful. This doubt is
heightened when one recalls that both sides of the debate em-
braced legal positivism and justified their positions by reference to
different understandings of the Constitution. It is hard to see how
the acceptance of legal positivism can play a significant causal role
when the position was essentially embraced by both sides of the
debate. Arguments about Swift did not turn on whether law must
have authority behind it or be grounded in some social fact.
Doubts about the causal significance of legal positivism increase
when one considers the competing causal explanations for Swift's
demise. One such factor was the problem of nonuniformity. Be-
tween Swift and the end of the nineteenth century, the categories
of general law had expanded from the law of negotiable instruments
to include dozens of other private law doctrines.' According to the
10 White, supra note 58, at 389.
61 Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See id. at 533-35 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also White, supra note 58, at 389
("It is hard to know on what grounds Holmes thought unconstitutional the practice of
federal courts declining to be bound by the substantive common law rules of states in
which they sat."). After his Black & White Taxicab dissent, Holmes in a letter to
Pollock described the federal court practice of applying general common law as
"usurpation" and "arrogant assumption," but he never explained either the content
of his constitutional objection or the relationship between legal positivism and that
objection. White, supra note 58, at 389.
3Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes of course
might have had any number of reasons for not proposing to overrule Swift.
14See Freyer, supra note 7, at 56-58, 71 (providing examples such as tort liability,
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critics of Swift, this led to a broad divergence between the sub-
stantive law applied in state and federal courts.65 Although Swift's
defenders argued that these claims were overstated,' the evidence
of nonuniformity appeared overwhelming in the years before Erie.
This made Swift's goal of a uniform law as an aid to national devel-
opment appear chimerical. It also fed arguments that the Swift re-
gime promoted forum shopping and, more broadly, encouraged
abusive litigation tactics. 67
The forum shopping concern was exacerbated by the identity of
the shoppers: primarily corporations looking for favorable law in
federal court. The law available in federal court consistently fa-
vored creditors over debtors, and more generally displayed a sig-
nificant pro-corporate bias. The apparent unfairness of this bias,
the attendant worry that the federal forum shopping promoted by
this bias led to an overcrowded and inefficient judicial system, and
the related concern that federal courts favored eastern over south-
ern and western interests, formed the primary criticisms of Swift in
the last half of the nineteenth century. These factors led Congress
seriously to consider limiting diversity jurisdiction as early as
1875.69 Criticisms of both Swift and diversity jurisdiction grew in
the early twentieth century when "corporations developed the
practice of reorganizing in states with loose incorporation laws,
solely for purposes of creating diversity of citizenship between
themselves and local residents... [in order] to avoid state law
when it was against them."7 The most notorious example of this
practice was at issue in the 1928 Supreme Court decision of Black
& White Taxicab.
The decision in Black & White Taxicab caused an enormous
outcry in Congress and the academy and led many, including
Brandeis, to make serious attempts to eliminate diversity jurisdic-
municipal bonds, property use, and employer-employee relations).
"See, e.g., George C. Holt, The Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Federal and State
Courts (1888); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 524-30 (1928).
6See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concur-
rent Jurisdiction, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 869, 881-86 & n.23 (1931).
67 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdic-
tion in Industrial America, 1870-1958, at 224-30 (1992).
6" See Freyer, supra note 7, at 76-77, 102-05; Purcell, supra note 67, at 226.
11 See Freyer, supra note 7, at 78-82.
70 Id. at 102.
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tion.7" The controversy following Black & White Taxicab is sig-
nificant. It occurred between roughly 1928 and 1932, the year in
which three different bills were introduced in Congress restricting
or eliminating diversity jurisdiction.' Because the controversy
erupted during the decade before Erie and was largely in response
to the Swift regime as applied in Black & White Taxicab, the terms
of the debate suggest Erie's immediate causal antecedents.' The
considerations invoked were either the Constitution or policy, not
jurisprudential theories.' Policy considerations included nonuni-
formity in law, forum shopping, pro-corporate bias, and over-
crowded federal courts.75 Constitutional considerations ranged
from Article III's language and purpose to concerns about the ef-
7' See id. at 109-11; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 nn.20 & 21 (collecting congressional
bills and hearings related to the proposed elimination of diversity jurisdiction or ab-
rogation of Swift).
72See H.R. 4526, 72d Cong. (1932); H.R. 11508, 72d Cong. (1932); H.R. 10594, 72d
Cong. (1932).
For good summaries of the debate, see Hessel E. Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.A. J.
71 (1933); Yntema & Jaffin, supra note 66, at 879-89.
7,The many law review articles critical of Black & White Taxicab focused on policy
and constitutional considerations, not jurisprudential theories. See George W. Ball,
Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 356, 362-64 (1933); Charles
N. Campbell, Is Swift v. Tyson an Argument for or against Abolishing Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction?, 18 A.B.A. J. 809, 810-11 (1932); Charles I. Dawson, Con-
flict of Decisions Between State and Federal Courts in Kentucky, and the Remedy,
20 Ky. LJ. 3, 4-5 (1931); Armistead M. Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson,
16 Va. L. Rev. 225, 229-36 (1930); J.B. Fordham, Note, The Federal Courts and the
Construction of Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C. L. Rev. 423, 428-29 (1929); Jeff B.
Fordham, Swift v. Tyson and the Construction of State Statutes, 41 W. Va. L.Q. 131,
134 (1935); Frankfurter, supra note 65, at 524-30; Raymond T. Johnson, State Law
and the Federal Courts, 17 Ky. L.J. 355, 358-65 (1929); Thomas W. Shelton, Concur-
rent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and Its Dangers, 15 Va. L. Rev. 137, 146-50 (1928). A
few of these articles quoted from Holmes's Black & White Taxicab dissent, see Daw-
son, supra, at 5-6; Dobie, supra, at 232-33; Frankfurter, supra note 65, at 527-28;
Johnson, supra, at 362-63, but none of these articles except Dobie's pursued the ju-
risprudential theme, see Dobie, supra, at 232-36 (noting jurisprudential differences
between Swift and Holmes's dissent in Black & White Taxicab), and none of them
(including Dobie's) made a connection between Swift's jurisprudential commitment
and its constitutional implications.
75 See articles cited, supra note 74; Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: Hearing
on H.R. 10594, H.R. 4526, H.R. 11508 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d
Cong. 1-104 (1932) [hereinafter House Hearing]; Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: Hearings on S. 937, S. 939, and S. 3243 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong. 1-139 (1932) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
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fect of diversity jurisdiction on due process.76 Frankfurter, by his
own account, saw the matter as one of "wise expediency," not of
"principle."'  His objection to Swift, stated in 1928 and repeated in
a report to a congressional committee in 1932, was that it created
a pernicious nonuniformity between the law applied in state and
federal courts.78 Along with others, he also doubted whether state
courts were biased against nonresident defendants.79 Warren's ob-
jection to diversity jurisdiction was based on his denial of a bias
against nonresident defendants, backed by historical research
about the origins of Article III's grant of diversity jurisdiction.'
The participants' own reasons for opposing Swift therefore were
based on policy or constitutional considerations, not jurispruden-
tial concerns.
Nor did jurisprudential concerns likely move the author of Erie.
The policy concerns of nonuniformity in law, forum shopping, a
pro-corporate bias, and overcrowded federal dockets are what
Brandeis had in mind when he says in Erie that the "benefits ex-
pected to flow from the [Swift] rule did not accrue," and when he
notes Swift's "defects, political and social" and its "mischievous re-
76 For the Article III arguments, see the sources cited, supra notes 74-75. On the
latter point about due process, see House Hearing, supra note 75, at 64-65 (statement
of Washington Bowie, representative of Fidelity & Deposit Co., to the effect that di-
versity jurisdiction is a matter of fundamental constitutional right); S. Rep. No. 72-
530, at 7 (1932) (Senator Norris's argument that diversity jurisdiction protects prop-
erty rights more than personal liberty).
71 Frankfurter, supra note 65, at 506. Frankfurter would, of course, later suggest
that rejection of Swift was premised on a change in legal theory. See Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (Erie "overruled a particular way of looking at
law .... ).
n' See Frankfurter, supra note 65, at 528; House Hearing, supra note 75, at 100.
71 See Frankfurter, supra note 65, at 526; House Hearing, supra note 75, at 103
(memorandum of Felix Frankfurter); see also S. Rep. No. 72-530, at 13 (asserting that
state court prejudice no longer exists); House Hearing, supra note 75, at 97 (letter of
Charles Warren) (stating that prejudice against nonresidents is "seldom" the reason
for bringing suit in federal court); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 492-97 (1928) (proposing that no historical evi-
dence of state judge prejudice against citizens of another state can be found); Charles
Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 Va. L. Rev. 661, 685 (1933)
(arguing the possibility of prejudice against out-of-state citizens has "largely disap-
peared"); cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 12-13 (statement of Attorney Gen-
eral Mitchell to the effect that prejudice against foreign corporations is implausible);
id. at 36-37 (memorandum of Dean Clark stating that prejudice is not "proven").
80 Warren, supra note 79; House Hearing, supra note 75, at 97.
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suits.""' To be sure, Brandeis joined in Holmes's dissent in Black &
White Taxicab and quoted its statement that Swift offended hard
legal positivism in Erie.' And Brandeis apparently read academic
criticisms of Swift, including some based on positivism, in the
course of drafting the Erie opinion.83 But other biographical data
suggests that his objection to Swift was to its social and political
consequences, not its jurisprudential assumptions.
For one thing, a jurisprudential concern would have been out
of character. Brandeis consistently subjected legal rules to cost-
benefit analysis and rejected philosophical abstractions.' For Bran-
deis, judicial decisionmaking was not a process of "reasoning from
abstract conception," but rather one of "reasoning from life" and
taking "notice of... facts."' This supports suggestions that Bran-
deis was moved by his longstanding policy objections to diversity
jurisdiction,86 including the vices of forum shopping by corporate
defendants and Swift's effect of reducing effective state sover-
eignty.' Brandeis's efforts to have Frankfurter press the case for
bErie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
In assessing why Brandeis included quotations from Holmes's Black & White
Taxicab dissent in Erie, it should be recalled that "in quite personal terms, Erie al-
lowed Brandeis to pay public homage to Holmes, his departed friend and colleague,
who for more than a quarter-century had been recognized as the major intellectual
and constitutional antagonist of Swift and the federal common law." Purcell, supra
note 67, at 225.
-3 See Freyer, supra note 7, at 132-33.
See, e.g., G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading
American Judges 163-64 (expanded ed. 1988).
1, Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 Ill. L. Rev. 461,465 (1916).
16 See Charles W. Eliot, Moorfield Story, Louis D. Brandeis, Adolph J. Rodenbeck,
& Roscoe Pound, Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the Administration of Justice
28 (1914):
In those parts of the country in which resort to the federal courts in case of di-
versity of citizenship is common the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal
courts on the ground of diverse citizenship often causes much delay, expense,
and uncertainty .... Moreover, the differences in the view which state and fed-
eral courts respectively take as to the law applicable to the same case result in
irritation which has somewhat impaired the usefulness of the federal courts in
some localities.
Id; see also Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People 378-79 (1984)
(noting Brandeis's longstanding objections to diversity jurisdiction).
9 One of Brandeis's biographers summarizes Brandeis's attitude as follows:
Brandeis was outraged by [the result in Black & White Taxicab]. It not only re-
flected an unfair discrimination in the implementation of the law; it also meant
that the state could not control its own affairs. It confirmed his view that the
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eliminating diversity jurisdiction further support the point.8 Since
Frankfurter's objections to Swift at this time were ones of policy, it
is a fair inference that Brandeis's objections were too.
For all of these reasons, we think the historical connection be-
tween the truth of legal positivism and Erie's holding is doubtful.
Lawrence Lessig's recent attempts to draw more complicated his-
torical connections do not meet these concerns. Lessig describes a
pattern which he calls the "Erie-effect."9 This pattern has two
parts. First, a changed conception of law occurs which makes a
previous conception controversial. Second, the controversial na-
ture of a previous conception of law renders the existing allocation
of institutional authority illegitimate.' In order to minimize the
costs of the resulting illegitimacy, Lessig argues, courts reallocate
legal authority. Legal positivism figures in the first part of the
"Erie-effect." According to Lessig, the rise of positivism made
controversial a notion of common law as existing independently of
social practices of one sort or another, including the decisions of
state courts. Previously thought legitimate, the authority of federal
courts to create common law became open to question. The Court
in Erie reduced the costs of illegitimacy by requiring federal courts
to follow the rules created by the decisions of state courts. Lessig
concludes that beliefs about legal positivism occasioned a constitu-
tional issue of judicial authority which Erie resolved.91
jurisdiction of federal courts had to be reduced. So he joined Holmes's vigor-
ous dissent [in Black & White Taxicab].
Lewis J. Paper, Brandeis 382 (1983); see also Philippa Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Pro-
gressivism 88-89 (1993) (explaining Erie as driven by Brandeis's fear of corporate
power and his commitment to federalism and state experimentation).
as See Letter from Brandeis to Frankfurter (Apr. 21, 1928), in "Half Brother, Half
Son": The Letters of Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter 330, 330-31 (Melvin I.
Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991) [hereinafter "Half Brother, Half Son"]; cf. Let-
ter from Brandeis to Frankfurter (May 3, 1938), in "Half Brother, Half Son," supra,
at 612, 613 ("With Swift v. Tyson removed, won't it be possible now to go further in
limiting diversity citizenship jurisdiction?") (footnotes omitted).
See Lessig, Erie-Effects, supra note 7, at 1787-95; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365, 1410-11 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint]; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 7, at 433-38.
10 See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 89, at 1410.
11 Lessig, Erie-Effects, supra note 7, at 1787-95; Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, su-
pra note 89, at 1400-11; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 7, at
426-37. As we mentioned above, see supra note 11, Lessig does not clearly distin-
guish the historical, the conceptual, and the normative connections between legal
positivism and Erie's holding. And sometimes Lessig hedges on the historical con-
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Understood as a causal explanation, the "Erie-effect" argument
has significant problems. It does not explain the temporal gap be-
tween the reception of legal positivism and the decision in Erie. It
does not explain the significance of the other competing causal fac-
tors or how positivism related to these factors. And it does not
explain how a theory of law embraced by all parties to the debate
and not ostensibly central to it nonetheless played a dispositive
causal role. In addition, there are difficulties of detail. Central to
the "Erie-effect" is a link between the reception of legal positivism
and an increase in institutional costs associated with Swift. Show-
ing that Swift's application made the lawmaking authority of fed-
eral courts increasingly controversial and that Erie made it less so,
by itself, says nothing about the role of legal positivism.92 For the
same can be said of many Supreme Court decisions that reduce in-
stitutional costs by fashioning constitutional doctrine to make leg-
islative or judicial lawmaking less controversial. To support the
"Erie-effect," Lessig therefore must show that legal positivism
caused the increase in institutional costs associated with Swift's ap-
plication. In particular, he must provide evidence indicating that
legal positivism brought into doubt the legitimacy of federal courts
making general federal common law. Otherwise, the causal link
between a changed conception of law and Erie contains a gap.
Lessig provides no such evidence.
nection, acknowledging that Erie resulted from a variety of factors (one of which was
legal positivism) of uncertain causal efficacy. See, e.g., Lessig, Fidelity and Con-
straint, supra note 89, at 1409 n.130; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra
note 7, at 430.
11 Although the institutional costs associated with Swift are well known, Lessig does
not explain the mechanism that reduces illegitimacy costs by institutional realloca-
tion. Reallocation to minimize illegitimacy costs assumes that all such costs are felt
by the same actor, so that the actor allocates authority in such a way as to raise the
fewest qualms about its political propriety. Otherwise, here as elsewhere, the actor's
decision can only reduce illegitimacy costs for itself, and is not guaranteed to mini-
mize overall illegitimacy costs. The Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and Con-
gress are different actors who felt different illegitimacy costs associated with Swift.
The lower federal courts adopted common law rules which increasingly diverged
from state law. Congress failed to remove or limit the original jurisdiction of federal
courts in diversity cases or displace common law by statute. And the Supreme Court
itself failed to overrule Swift. Because none of these institutions felt all the illegiti-
macy costs of Swift, Erie cannot be easily described as a case in which the Court was
induced to minimize illegitimacy costs. The diffusion of illegitimacy costs combined
with Swift's longevity and precedential weight requires postulation of a mechanism
connecting the illegitimacy costs and the Court's decision in Erie.
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It is worth repeating our point so far. We do not deny that there
might be a historical link between beliefs about legal positivism
and Erie's holding. The link appears initially plausible because it is
suggested by the language in the Erie opinion. But the often-
asserted historical connection rests on very little affirmative evi-
dence and ignores considerable countervailing evidence. Legal
positivism was embraced by both critics and supporters of Swift, it
was not central to the debate about Swift, and few if any ever de-
fended Swift on anti-positivist terms. In addition, there were pow-
erful independent causal factors at work that were much more cen-
tral to legal and political debates about the validity of the Swift
regime. Finally, Holmes asserted a connection between legal posi-
tivism and a constitutional deficiency with little explanation, and
theories about the nature of law almost certainly were not the
primary influence on Brandeis. For these reasons, we find the his-
torical connection implausible. Even if there is such a historical
connection, however, it would not affect our claims that there are
no conceptual or normative connections between legal positivism
and Erie's holding. We now turn to these claims.
III. CONCEPTUAL CONNECTIONS
Unlike the historical connection, which asserts a causal relation
between courts' beliefs about legal positivism's truth and Erie's
holding, a conceptual connection asserts a logical relation between
legal positivism's truth and Erie's holding.93 On this view, legal
positivism is a premise in an argument whose conclusion is one
of constitutional constraint on federal courts. Legal positivism
might be sufficient for the Erie holding. Alternatively, it might be
necessary. Or, most strongly, legal positivism might be necessary
and sufficient for Erie's holding. Our contention is that Erie's
commitment to legal positivism is conceptually independent of its
constitutional holding. In other words, we claim that legal positiv-
ism is neither necessary nor sufficient for Erie's holding.
For possible assertions of a conceptual connection between Erie and legal posi-
tivism, see Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 7, at 431 ("Change
one idea in philosophy, transform in some small way a bit of legal language, and this
century-old doctrine of Swift quickly falls away."); Casto, supra note 7, at 907-08
(Erie's embrace of positivism "virtually dictated the overruling of Swift v. Tyson and
the creation of the Erie doctrine.") (footnotes omitted).
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The argument for the claim is straightforward. Suppose legal
positivism is true. Suppose, that is, that everything we call law
must be traced to a sovereign source or otherwise be grounded in a
social practice. The Erie holding still could be wrong. For the
truth of legal positivism is consistent with any number of concep-
tions of the constitutional role of federal courts. It is consistent
with the view that the sovereign in the form of the Constitution's
Article III authorizes federal courts to make an independent judg-
ment about the content of state law. (This is how some judges and
commentators viewed Swift.94) It is consistent with the view that
the sovereign requires federal courts to develop a national com-
mon law that is based on similar sources as state common law but
that is neither state law nor federal law within the meaning of Arti-
cle VI. (This is how others viewed Swift.95) And it is consistent
with Erie's holding that the Constitution requires federal courts in
non-federal question cases to apply state law as interpreted by state
courts. The differences between these views turn on differences of
constitutional understanding. All three views are consistent with
legal positivism's requirement that law be grounded in a sovereign
source or social fact. Positivism alone says nothing about which
roles are appropriate for federal courts. 6
The point generalizes. Erie's holding describes a constitutional
constraint on the lawmaking powers of federal courts. Legal posi-
tivism states conditions for norms being law: namely, that they
depend on features of a social practice. The conditions tell us
what counts as law, but they do not tell us whether courts must
apply law, or how the sovereign requires law to be identified, or
how lawmaking authority is allocated. Legal positivism leaves
these questions unanswered. The questions must be answered by
particular constitutional systems. Whether United States federal
courts have certain lawmaking power depends on whether they are
sovereign or whether lawmaking power has been delegated to them
14 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Pro-Swift positivists argued that the Swift regime was correct because Article III
authorized federal courts to make an independent and neutral judgment about the
content of state law. See supra note 43. These commentators were not conceptually
confused; their arguments were not illogical. If their arguments were wrong, they
were wrong because they were bad readings of Article III, not because they were in-
consistent with legal positivism.
1998] 695
Virginia Law Review
by a sovereign via constitutional provision. Article I, Article III,
and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments perhaps work to restrict the
lawmaking power of federal courts. The truth of legal positivism
alone does not. This shows that legal positivism is not a sufficient
condition for Erie's holding.
Suppose now that legal positivism is false. The Erie holding still
could be correct. This is because legal positivism defines an entirely
general theory that holds for legal norms in all possible legal sys-
tems. Legal positivism, therefore, is false if there exists at least one
possible legal system in which some legal norms do not depend on
social practicesY Erie's holding, on the other hand, is limited. It
describes a constraint on federal courts imposed by constitutional
provisions within a particular legal system. Because the holding is
constitutional, it does not extend past the particular legal system in
which the relevant constitutional constraint operates. Hence, the
only conditions on which Erie's holding depends are those obtain-
ing in a particular legal system, not in all possible legal systems.
Since the conditions need not (and likely do not) obtain in all pos-
sible legal systems, legal positivism might be false while Erie's
holding is correct.
The former law of Louisiana illustrates the possibility. For a
long time, section 21 of Louisiana's Civil Code required Louisiana
courts to apply "natural law and reason, or received usages, where
positive law is silent."98 During this period Louisiana courts fre-
quently applied natural law." Louisiana thus took a different view
17 See Coleman, supra note 22, at 163; cf. Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts,
14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 703 (1991) (arguing that positivism is a conceptual claim to
the effect that morality is not a condition of legality in all possible legal systems).
Is La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 21 (West 1973). Louisiana's revision of the Civil Code in
1987 modified this provision to read: "When no rule for a particular situation can be
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity.
To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages." La.
Civ. Code Ann. art. 4 (West 1993).
See, e.g., Spencer v. Children's Hospital, 432 So. 2d 823, 825-26 (La. 1983)
(relying on natural law and equitable principles to provide procedural devices where
none exist under positive law); Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So. 2d 1309, 1311 (La.
1976) ("In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, we chose to de-
cide the case in accordance with the underlying principles upon which our community
system is based, natural law and reason."); West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242, 248 (La.
1975) (holding that, since no positive law governed distribution of settlement moneys,
resort to natural law was "in order"); Farris v. LaMont, 425 So. 2d 970, 971 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (using natural law and equity in absence of positive law to forbid lawyer
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of what counts as law than did Holmes and company. But Erie's
holding did not in any way impugn the validity of Louisiana's legal
system or counsel less respect for Louisiana law. Erie required
federal courts sitting in diversity in Louisiana to apply natural law
when there was no controlling positive Louisiana law."° This shows
that Erie's holding rests on a constitutional command and not on
the truth of legal positivism.
It is no response here to say that Louisiana's commitment to
natural law was consistent with legal positivism because it was
authorized by Louisiana's sovereign command in section 21 of the
Civil Code. Erie would have required application of natural law
even if Louisiana state courts applied natural law by judicial fiat
rather than legislative authorization. Of course, a positivist could
argue that in this circumstance, the sovereign authority was the
state judge that incorporates natural law into the state's legal sys-
tem. But this move is fatal to the conceptual connection. For un-
der this view, even an extreme natural law interpretation of the
Swift regime would be consistent with legal positivism because the
sovereign voice of the United States Supreme Court applied the
general common law. And this in turn shows that legal positivism
is consistent with Swift and is not a sufficient condition of Erie's
holding.
There is a plausible but defective strategy for preserving positiv-
ism's relevance to Erie's holding. One could say that it is by virtue
of legal positivism's truth that constitutional constraints can insist
on a federal or state authority for judicial lawmaking. Both fed-
eral and state authority ultimately rest on social practices of one
sort or another-both are ultimately social sources of law. Unless
federal and state authority are instances of law, constitutional con-
straints would not be constraints of law and would not operate.
Constitutional constraints, on this view, are parasitic on the truth of
legal positivism. Since Erie's holding depends on constitutional
constraints, the holding depends on positivism being true. The
point can be expressed in terms of Austinian positivism alone. Law
must be grounded in a sovereign command. The sovereign sources
from profiting from his own mistakes).
-C° See, e.g., Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 167, 170 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971); Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., 412
F.2d 1011, 1025-28, 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826, 841-42 (W.D.
La. 1979), aff'd 631 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
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in the United States are the state governments and the federal gov-
ernment. Positivism thus requires federal courts to apply either
state or federal law. By recognizing the obvious dependence of
Erie's holding on constitutional considerations while preserving
legal positivism's relevance to them, this strategy insulates Erie's
holding from the irrelevance claim.
This insulation strategy is defective."' It gets things almost ex-
actly backwards. It is not in virtue of positivism that constitutional
constraints require federal courts to look to federal or state
authority for lawmaking. At most, constitutional constraints direct
courts to endorse legal positivism, not the other way around. If the
Constitution requires federal courts to apply federal or state law, it
does so by virtue of constitutional text and a practice of regulating
the exercise of political power by reference to that text, not legal
positivism. Federal courts have no allegiance to legal positivism, or
any other theory of law, unless the Constitution says so. In fact, it
is conceivable that the Constitution could embrace a theory of law
other than positivism. Imagine, for instance, that the Constitution
provided that "law need not be grounded in a sovereign source or
social fact, and federal courts can apply natural law." The truth of
legal positivism then would not require courts to apply only law
grounded in a sovereign source or social fact." This possibility
means that it is the Constitution that makes legal positivism rele-
vant, if at all, and not vice versa.
The point can be put more generally as follows. Call the con-
stitutional constraint on the power of federal courts to make gen-
eral common law "C." If Erie is correct, the Constitution requires C.
101 One reason it is defective is that, as we argued above, supra pp. 123-24, even if
legal positivism required federal courts to apply state or federal law, it would say
nothing about what the appropriate sources of law were. It is perfectly consistent with
legal positivism for the Constitution to require federal courts to make an independ-
ent judgment about the content of state law. Thus, even if legal positivism requires
recourse to the Constitution as the sovereign source of lawmaking and law allocation
in the United States, legal positivism says nothing about the actual allocation of law-
making power under the Constitution.
10 One might respond that the application of natural law is consistent with legal
positivism here because the truth of legal positivism requires courts to follow the con-
stitutional command. This response, like the similar response to Louisiana's applica-
tion of natural law, proves too much and ultimately undermines the conceptual con-
nection by making everything-including Swift-consistent with legal positivism. See
supra p. 125.
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C, however, need not state a constraint of law, as the insulation
strategy wrongly supposes. For C's character as a constraint does
not derive from its status as law. Rather, the constraint is the
product of the Constitution and a practice of regulating the exer-
cise of political power by reference to the Constitution. (The prac-
tice includes an oath of office to uphold the Constitution.) And
whether the Constitution and the underlying practice are instances
of law depends on what conditions of legality turn out to be. Be-
cause C's constraint derives from the Constitution and the Con-
stitution may or may not be law, C may or may not state a legal
constraint. Still, C's status as a constraint is unaffected. For if C
is a legal constraint, then it states a legal restriction on the law-
making authority of federal courts. If it is not a legal constraint,
C still operates as a restriction, only now not as a legal constraint
on the authority to make law. In both cases, C functions as a re-
striction, according to the Erie holding. C's status as constraint on
the exercise of governmental power therefore is unrelated to its
status as law. So C's restriction on the lawmaking power of federal
courts does not depend on the truth of jurisprudential theses such
as legal positivism.
Another strategy for preserving a conceptual connection is to
alter the version of legal positivism at work. Instead of "hard"
positivism, it might be thought that "soft" positivism could main-
tain the connection between positivism and Erie's holding. "Soft"
positivism, recall, allows social practices upon which the existence
of law depends to incorporate moral principles. One might think
that moral principles require that common lawmaking authority
not be lodged in federal courts. The strategy fails for at least three
reasons. First, "soft" positivism's truth does not entail that social
practices must resort to moral principles. This is a contingent
matter, true in a particular legal system. "Soft" positivism, by al-
lowing law to incorporate moral principle, does not require it.
Second, it is a stretch from the possibility that social practice incor-
porates resort to moral or political principle to the particular moral
or political principle needed to make the Erie holding correct.
Erie's holding requires a principle about the morally prescribed
allocation of common lawmaking authority among branches of
government. Even if such a moral principle exists-and it's doubt-
ful-the principle is a matter of substantive moral theory, not of
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the conceptual requirements of law. Third, even if "soft" positiv-
ism included a moral principle prohibiting federal common law-
making power, it would not match up with Erie's holding. This is
because "soft" positivism is a perfectly general thesis, and, as a
conceptual truth, holds for all possible legal systems and decision-
makers. Therefore, the moral principle supposedly prohibiting
federal common lawmaking also would prohibit common lawmak-
ing by state courts. Erie's holding recognizes a distinction among
decisionmakers that "soft" positivism does not recognize. A less
restrictive version of legal positivism does not therefore maintain a
conceptual connection between positivism and Erie's result.
In sum, legal positivism's truth is neither necessary nor sufficient
for Erie's holding. Legal positivism is thus conceptually irrelevant
to Erie. To the extent that it suggests otherwise, the language of
Brandeis's opinion is deceptive.
IV. NORMATIVE CONNECTIONS
A normative connection is another possible relation between
legal positivism and Erie's holding. This connection is one of jus-
tification. It says that, whatever else might provide a good reason
for Erie's holding, the truth of legal positivism provides additional
support or authority for the holding. Articles I and III, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, and constitutional principles of federalism
and separation of powers might restrict the common lawmaking
authority of federal courts. The normative connection views legal
positivism's requirement that law depends on a sovereign com-
mand or social practices as a further reason for the same conclusion.
Arguments for the normative connection begin with the assump-
tion that Swift commits itself to a belief in or application of law not
grounded in a sovereign source or social practice. They then claim
that legal positivism's requirement that law must be traced to the
act of a sovereign or some social fact undermines Swift and pro-
vides a good reason for Erie's holding. At this point the normative
connection has several versions. Some versions say that legal posi-
tivism limits courts to applying the sovereign's command, and the
relevant sovereign command-the United States Constitution-
requires federal courts to apply state or federal law. Other ver-
sions say that the Constitution obligates federal courts to apply
state or federal law, and legal positivism requires this law to be
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grounded in the sovereign commands of the state government or
the federal government.
These claimed normative connections fail for many of the same
reasons as the conceptual connection. If, as Holmes asserted, the
Swift regime rested on a commitment to natural law (or a rejection
of legal positivism), then the truth of legal positivism might be a
reason to reject the Swift regime so understood. But even assum-
ing the correctness of this probably-unfair characterization of the
Swift regime," it does not follow that the truth of legal positivism
is a reason to embrace Erie's holding. As explained above, any
number of constitutional arrangements are consistent with legal
positivism, and legal positivism by itself does not provide a reason
to pick and choose among them. Indeed, even though legal posi-
tivism might provide a reason to reject the extreme natural law
interpretation of Swift, it does not provide a reason to reject the
various other understandings of the identical Swift regime held by
Corbin and company that are consistent with legal positivism. Le-
gal positivism cannot begin to tell us which of many possible consti-
tutional understandings about the allocation of state and federal
power are correct. Only the Constitution can do so.
The argument by now should be familiar. Legal positivism, if
true, is a truth about law, not an evaluation of the merits of federal
courts creating general federal common law. Erie's holding, on the
other hand, concerns the restrictions on federal courts' lawmaking
powers. Because legal positivism is a position about what consti-
tutes law while Erie concerns the proper role of federal courts in
lawmaking, legal positivism has nothing to say about the latter. It
is one thing for law to depend on social practices of various sorts.
Whether it is a good thing, or constitutionally compelled, that
federal courts not create general federal common law is another
matter. The latter is a substantive moral or constitutional position
that is the conclusion of a normative argument about the legi-
timacy of allocating lawmaking authority to federal courts. The
former is a conceptual claim about law. Legal positivism only
makes the conceptual claim and has nothing to say about the nor-
mative argument. The move from legal positivism's truth to the
103 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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normative (constitutional) position embedded in Erie's holding is a
simple non sequitur.
One strategy to preserve a normative connection between legal
positivism and Erie's holding is to alter the working notion of legal
positivism. Legal positivism could be understood not as a concep-
tion of law but as a view about proper judicial decision. According
to this understanding, sometimes called normative or adjudicatory
positivism, judges should decide cases by invoking materials
which derive their authority from a sovereign command or social
facts." Normative positivism permits decision by appeal to legal
rules in force but prohibits case resolution by moral judgments.
Normative positivism might appear to make some sense of Erie.
The Constitution divides lawmaking authority between the federal
political branches and the states. It does not allocate lawmaking
authority to federal courts. The division is underwritten by the ex-
tra-constitutional practice of judicial recourse to the document's
provisions. Therefore, constitutional provisions limit federal courts'
common lawmaking powers. Normative positivism's prescription
to decide cases by materials ultimately authorized by social facts
supports this conclusion.
The argument has a lot going for it. It is directed at the authori-
tative sources of law under the Constitution and away from general
conditions of legality. Normative positivism also might be histori-
cally and politically important to the result in Erie. Erie followed a
series of cases in the first quarter of the twentieth century in which
federal courts created law considered socially or politically regres-
sive. " Progressive judicial lawmaking could occur more broadly at
the state level if the common lawmaking powers of federal courts
were restricted. Requiring that lawmaking have both a legislative
source at a federal level and a legislative or decisional source at a
104 See Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 328-36 (1986);
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the
Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 645, 677-78 (1991); Jeremy Waldron, Kant's
Legal Positivism, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1535, 1541 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, The Irrele-
vance of Moral Objectivity, in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 158, 161-
62 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
10, See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910);
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905).
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state level helps achieve this end. By having judicial decision rely
on particular sorts of legal rules backed by social facts, the re-
quirement is an application of normative positivism.
This is a plausible but unsuccessful attempt to save the norma-
tive connection. For one thing, the strategy succeeds by dropping a
commitment to legal positivism and substituting normative posi-
tivism, a different thesis. Legal positivism is a claim about the con-
ditions necessary for a norm to be a legal norm-conditions of le-
gality. Normative positivism is a thesis about how judges should
decide cases. A claim about the nature of legal norms does not en-
tail an insistence that legal decision proceed from materials author-
ized by social facts. By dropping a commitment to legal positivism,
the strategy asserts a different normative connection.
More important, on its own terms, the strategy fails. This is be-
cause normative positivism does not provide a good reason for
Erie's holding either. Erie prohibits federal courts from making
federal common law while leaving to states the authority to allow
state courts to make common law. But normative positivism, if
correct, places the same restriction on all judicial decisions,
whether federal or state courts are involved. Normative positivism,
after all, requires judicial decision to proceed from materials
backed by a sovereign command or (unspecified) social facts, not
just particular courts or issues. It cannot distinguish between fed-
eral and state courts. Hence what goes for federal courts goes for
state courts as well: If positivism supports prohibiting federal
courts from common lawmaking, it supports the same prohibition
in the case of state courts. Since Erie's holding prohibits only
common lawmaking by federal courts, normative positivism does
not accurately describe the association between it and the holding
in Erie.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Our claim that legal positivism is conceptually and normatively
irrelevant to Erie's holding has several implications.
1. The irrelevance claim bears indirectly on the claimed histori-
cal connection between the reception of positivism and Erie's
holding. If Erie's holding is both conceptually and normatively in-
dependent of legal positivism, then the historical connection is less
likely than otherwise. The historical connection attributes to the
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Justices who decided Erie a belief that legal positivism had a con-
ceptual or normative implication for Erie's constitutional holding.
If our irrelevance claim is right, the Justices' beliefs were false. It
is, of course, possible that the Justices held false jurisprudential
beliefs. But it is unlikely, especially in light of the competing ex-
planations for Erie's holding, as well as the fact that critics and
proponents of Swift alike embraced positivism. Both sides were
perfectly clear that their positions rested on views about the consti-
tutional or policy basis for federal common lawmaking by federal
courts. Given the irrelevance claim and the historical evidence, a
historical connection between legal positivism and Erie is less
likely than if the irrelevance claim were false.
2. The irrelevance claim bears on philosophical criticisms of the
opinion in Erie. George Rutherglen, for instance, thinks Erie's
holding relies on legal positivism. He says that positivism is the
"linchpin" of the opinion in Erie and that positivism must be re-
jected."° Rutherglen thinks so because he believes that Erie's reli-
ance on legal positivism creates a paradox, and that this paradox is
a reason for rejecting the reliance. The paradox, as he presents it,
goes as follows."° Positivism requires that law have a source in
constitutional provisions, statutes, or prior decisions of officials
having political power. Erie in turn requires that federal law have
its source in state or federal law. Since both requirements are per-
fectly general, they also apply to the decision in Erie itself. But
Swift had a source in federal law, authorizing federal courts to cre-
ate general common law. It stated a rule of decision that federal
courts recognized for almost a hundred years. Erie, on the other
hand, overruled Swift but lacked the pedigree in federal law to do
so. Erie therefore lacks the pedigree its positivism insists that all
law must have. Hence Rutherglen's paradox: If Erie relies on legal
positivism, its own result is incorrect. If the result in Erie is correct,
Erie does not rely on legal positivism. Rutherglen concludes that
the paradox created means that Erie's holding must reject positiv-
ism and rely on constitutional justifications alone.
Part of Rutherglen's conclusion is no doubt correct: Erie's
holding can be defended on constitutional grounds alone. But his
,16 Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 292-93.
107 See id. at 291-92.
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supporting argument is unconvincing. One difficulty is that the
paradox he describes is apparent only, not genuine. Even if Erie
relies on legal positivism's truth, its result may still be correct. This
is because constitutional principles could be the source which with-
holds from federal courts the authority to make general federal
common law. If so, Erie would have the pedigree that positivism
insists all law contain. Swift and its progeny, on the other hand,
could lack a pedigree in that the lawmaking powers allocated to
federal courts by the Constitution did not allow them to make gen-
eral federal common law. To put the point in Hart's terms, the rule
of recognition then-existing in the United States could treat the
rule announced by Swift as invalid. If so, federal courts were sim-
ply mistaken in relying on Swift's authority as a source of law."8
Hence the decision in Erie may still be correct even if it relied on
the truth of legal positivism. Rutherglen's paradox is created only
because he assumes that Erie itself had no support in contemporary
authoritative sources. The assumption is controversial and no part
of a bare commitment to legal positivism. Because the assumption
need not be made, the paradox generated by Erie's supposed reli-
ance on positivism is merely apparent.
The more serious difficulty with Rutherglen's paradox is that
Erie's holding does not rely on legal positivism in the first place. It
relies only on constitutional principles, probably about the alloca-
tion of lawmaking powers between federal and state governments,
and possibly within the federal government.'" Rutherglen's para-
dox begins with the assumption that Erie relies on positivism and
insists that positivism's strictures be applied to the decision in Erie
itself. Since the irrelevance claim shows that this assumption is false,
the truth or falsity of positivism does not embarrass Erie's holding.
Il Rutherglen might say that an item cannot be a source of law unless it is recog-
nized as such by public officials. He might therefore conclude that because Swift was
recognized as consistent with constitutional principles, Erie was unsupported by a
source of law. This tack is implausible because it wrongly conflates a source of law
and the identification of that source. As long as public officials sometimes can be
mistaken as to the latter, the distinction remains. The distinction preserves the possi-
bility that Swift in fact lacked, and Erie in fact was backed by, a source in constitu-
tional principle.
119 See Michael C. Doff, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651,
708-09 (1995); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 Yale LJ. 1935, 1941-42
(1991).
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3. The irrelevance claim also informs debates about the doctrinal
implications of Erie's holding. These debates often assume that
Erie's embrace of legal positivism is relevant to their resolution.
The irrelevance claim suggests otherwise. Because legal positivism
is conceptually and normatively irrelevant to Erie's holding, it has
nothing to say about the doctrinal consequences of that holding.
Disputes which turn on the implications for constitutional doc-
trine of Erie's supposed commitment to positivism are therefore
misguided.
Consider, for example, the debate about what Erie requires fed-
eral courts to do when the state law they are supposed to apply is
ambiguous or unclear. Settled law requires federal courts to pre-
dict how the state's highest court would rule on the matter.1 Brad-
ford Clark has recently suggested that this predictive approach is in
tension with Erie's legal positivism."' Clark claims that "Erie em-
ployed a positivist conception of state law, under which such law
consists exclusively of sovereign commands.... ,, He argues that
Erie's embrace of legal positivism informed its constitutional prin-
ciples of judicial federalism in a way that requires federal courts
faced with ambiguous or undeveloped state law to either (a) rule
against the party who bears the burden of persuasion or, prefera-
bly, (b) certify the question of law to the highest court of the
state." 3
We are unsure precisely what role is played by legal positivism
and what part is played by the Constitution in Clark's scheme. But
it is clear that legal positivism alone has no consequences for this
debate. A predictive approach to ascertaining state law enjoins a
federal court to discern state law in a particular manner-by pre-
diction. Legal positivism is a thesis about the nature of law, not
about how judges ought to go about discerning it. Hence legal
positivism is perfectly consistent with a predictive approach to as-
certaining state law. Because positivism has nothing to say about
how law is to be discerned, it is also consistent with Clark's pre-
1,0 See Dorf, supra note 109, at 695.
"1 Clark, supra note 7, at 1462-64. Dorf, too, attacks predictivism in this context,
although he expressly eschews reliance on Erie's supposed jurisprudential commit-
ments. See Dorf, supra note 109, at 707-09.
M Clark, supra note 7, at 1462.
113 Id. at 1535-64.
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ferred highly deferential approach. In other words, both ascer-
taining state law by prediction and Clark's approach are compati-
ble with the view that law is a command of a sovereign or, more
generally, that law depends on social facts.114
Another context in which commentators have tried to gauge
Erie's practical consequences by reference to legal positivism con-
cerns the domestic legal status of customary international law.
Customary international law is the law of the international com-
munity that "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." '115 Prior to Erie,
United States courts applied customary international law in the ab-
sence of domestic authorization as non-federal general common
law of the sort applied in Swift."6 Erie overruled Swift and declared
that "[t]here is no federal general common law."..7 This raises the
question about customary international law's domestic legal status
after Erie. Can courts apply customary law as they did before Erie
in the absence of domestic authorization? Or must there be some
authorization in state or federal law for federal courts to apply cus-
tomary international law?
This issue has been much mooted in recent years."8 A. Mark
Weisburd has argued that Erie's commitment to legal positivism
resolves the controversy."9 He reasons as follows:
1" Clark's article can be read to recognize the irrelevance of legal positivism to this
issue. Clark acknowledges that the "Supreme Court's embrace of legal positiv-
ism.., is not sufficient to explain the Court's decision," and that the Court could
have embraced legal positivism and reached different conclusions about the common
law powers of federal courts. Id. at 1481-82. The Court rejected these other possi-
bilities, according to Clark, because it was "compelled [to do so] by a basic feature of
the constitutional structure-judicial federalism," id. at 1482, and for the rest of
Clark's analysis it is this constitutional principle, and not legal positivism, that does
the analytical work. Clark's supplementation of his argument based on Erie's posi-
tivism with an argument based on judicial federalism thus might bring him in agree-
ment with our point that legal positivism is not relevant-as constitutional and policy
arguments are-to the question of how federal courts must identify state law.
1,5 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2)
(1987).
16See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815,
822-26, 849-52 (1997).
- Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
"s Some courts and commentators rely on pre-Erie precedents applying customary
international law as non-federal general common law for the proposition that cus-
tomary international law is post-Erie federal common law. See, e.g., Filartiga v.
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[T]he human authority that creates customary international law
is the collective international community. That community
makes law by employing mechanisms as positivistic as those
the states employ. Thus, applying rules developed under the
authority of the international community... incorporates the
insight from Erie, that human agency creates law, and looks to
the appropriate agency to determine a particular law's content.12
Weisburd argues here that the domestic application of custom-
ary international law in the absence of authorization by the state
or federal government is consistent with Erie's holding because
customary international law is consistent with legal positivism. But
satisfaction of legal positivism does not satisfy Erie's holding.
Otherwise, federal courts could apply any number of laws-the
law of England, or of the American Arbitration Association, or of
the Elks Club of Little Rock, Arkansas-in the absence of state or
federal authorization to do so. More important, legal positivism
says nothing about the allocation of legal authority within the
United States or between international law and the United States.
Weisburd's analysis thus begs the crucial question of when and
why a court "looks to the appropriate agency to determine a par-
ticular law's content. 12'  Erie's constitutional holding says that
state or federal law must supply the authorization for federal
courts to apply customary international law." It is irrelevant
whether customary international law itself satisfies legal positivism.
Legal positivism is similarly irrelevant to the many other puzzles
about the implications of Erie's holding. Does Erie's holding re-
quire federal diversity courts to apply state choice of law rules?
The Court decided that it did because otherwise, "the accident of
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims
Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 Harv. Int'l Li. 53, 57-58 (1981). Others contend
that courts apply customary international law as a species of the federal common law
of foreign relations that is justified by the structure of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law
After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393 (1997). Yet others have questioned whether cus-
tomary international law is federal common law in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authorization. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 116.
119 A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 Yale
J. Int'l L. 1, 41 (1995).
120 Id. at 51.
121 Id.
122 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 116, at 853-54.
Legal Positivism
diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal admin-
istration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
side by side."1 Legal positivism would have had nothing to say to
this issue; the application of state or federal choice-of-law rules
would have been consistent with it. The same goes for the Court's
test for distinguishing between substance and procedure for Erie
purposes. The Court has resolved this problem differently over the
years, first asking whether it "significantly affect[ed] the result of a
litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would
be controlling" in a state court action,"4 later engaging in a bal-
ancing of state and federal interests," and finally settling on a
"twin aims" test that considered "discouragement of forum shop-
ping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 26 In
these cases the Court never considered the relevance of legal posi-
tivism. And with good reason, since legal positivism does not speak
to this issue.
These points generalize. Erie's holding raised many puzzles about
the proper allocation of state and federal authority in our consti-
tutional system. But legal positivism has nothing to say to these
issues: It is a general theory of law that does not speak to the ques-
tion about the allocation of lawmaking authority in the United
States or any other legal system. Commentators who attempt to
derive something about Erie's implications by recourse to legal
positivism thus commit a sort of category mistake.
4. We have argued that Erie's holding has nothing to do with
jurisprudential conceptions of law. This argument by itself says
nothing about Erie's bearing on other jurisprudential questions, in-
cluding the nature of judicial decision. But our analysis suggests
that Erie's holding also is irrelevant to these matters. Many com-
mentators, for example, contend that legal realism is relevant to
Erie's holding." Legal realism, in one of many understandings of
1- Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941).
14 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
15 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525,536-38 (1958).
"
6 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965).
127 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 695 (1989) (book
review) (claiming that Erie was "influenced" by legal realism); Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 512 (1954);
Kramer, supra note 7; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 7; cf.
Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 224 (calling Erie a "product" of legal realism).
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the term, assumes that judges decide cases by making public pol-
icy." For many of the same reasons that we are skeptical about
connections between legal positivism and Erie's holding, we are
skeptical about connections between legal realism and Erie's
holding. The historical connection between legal realism and Erie
is plausible, although almost certainly overstated. Few proponents
of Swift denied that federal courts made general common law.
And as Holmes's 1910 dissent in Kuhn pointed out, the Supreme
Court had expressly committed itself to the view that "decisions of
state courts of last resort make law for the State"' 29 at least since its
1864 decision in Gelpcke v. Dubuque.30 The Swift debate was
about whether the Constitution, federal statutes, and optimal pol-
icy required federal court deference to state decisions, not about
the nature of legal decision. There also is no conceptual connec-
tion between legal realism and Erie's holding. As with legal posi-
tivism, it is quite easy for legal realism to be true and Erie false,
and vice versa.
The normative connection between the truth of legal realism and
Erie's holding is also doubtful. At the very least, the truth of legal
realism does not provide a reason for Erie's holding as straightfor-
wardly as many believe. This is because both Erie's holding and
what it replaced are consistent with legal realism. For legal realism
is a perfectly general theory of judicial decisionmaking that applies
to all judicial decisions. It says that all judicial decisions, no matter
what the source of law, constitute policymaking. Before Erie fed-
eral courts applied a non-federal general common law that did
not require deference to state judicial decisions. In doing so, ac-
cording to realism, the courts were making public policy. Erie's
holding requires federal courts to apply state law, including state
judicial decisions, in cases not governed by federal law. This hold-
ing alters the sources of law in non-federal question cases. But if
2 See William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory
and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A Culture of Rights: The Bill
of Rights in Philosophy, Politics, and Law-1791 and 1991, at 266, 266-84 (Michael J.
Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 169-92 (1992); Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of
Value 82-84 (1973).
129 215 U.S. at 371 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
- 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
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legal realism is true, federal courts continue to make policy when
they "apply" state precedents." Since legal realism is consistent
with both Erie's holding and what it replaced, realism cannot be a
reason for adopting the holding.
Another, more plausible way to preserve the normative connec-
tion between legal realism and Erie's holding is through the Con-
stitution and federal statute. If the Constitution and the Rules of
Decision Act require federal courts in non-federal question cases
to defer to state policy, the truth of legal realism might be a good
reason for federal courts to defer to state common law in addition
to state statutes. Legal realism, on this view, tells federal courts
that the federal command to apply state law includes a require-
ment to apply state judge-made law. In this sense, one might argue
that legal realism provides a good reason for Erie's prohibition on
federal courts making general common law. This tack is initially
plausible. It assumes that the Constitution and the Rules of Deci-
sion Act make the truth of legal realism relevant to the allocation
of power in the federal system. The strategy also employs legal re-
alism as a reason for Erie without denying that federal courts in
non-federal question cases make policy.
Nonetheless, this argument overstates the significance of legal
realism to Erie's holding. Ultimately, Erie's requirement to apply
state decisional law must come from state or federal law, not from
legal realism. For if the state legislature directed that judicial deci-
sions are not to count as a source of state law, presumably Erie
would not require a federal court to apply state decisional law.
The same would be true if the Rules of Decision Act expressly
said that its obligation did not extend to state judicial decisions
(assuming the limitation was constitutional). These possibilities tell
us that Erie's directive to apply state judicial decisions derives from
constitutional or statutory sources, not from jurisprudential posi-
tions on the nature of judicial decisionmaking. There are doubt-
lessly readings of federal and state law that would make the truth
of legal realism relevant to the allocation of lawmaking power in
our federal system. Whether state and federal law now does so is a
3 This is a theoretical point that has proven to be true in practice. As any seasoned
litigator knows, the substantive and choice-of-law rules available in a federal diversity
court differ in important ways from the substantive and choice-of-law rules available
in the courts of the state in which the federal court sits.
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matter of contested interpretation. But even if state and federal
law make legal realism relevant in this way, it is the law of a par-
ticular legal system that is doing the justificatory work, not the
truth of legal realism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Doubts about the jurisprudential relevance of Erie's holding
began early. Writing shortly after the case was decided, Corbin
made short shrift of Holmes's dictum, recited in Brandeis's opin-
ion, to the effect that the common law was not a brooding omni-
presence in the sky."r  The question, Corbin said, was never
whether federal courts applied common law without authority. It
was always how this common law was identified.133 Clark signaled
his doubt politely, finding that Holmes's jurisprudential positions
were "not enough" to justify Erie's result."' We have argued that
the decision's holding is conceptually and normatively independent
of the truth of legal positivism. If the irrelevance claim is right, ju-
risprudential debates about the nature of law have no bearing at all
on Erie.
There is a broader lesson here about the dangers of attempting
to derive constitutional conclusions from theories of law. Consti-
tutional provisions no doubt presuppose some views about the
possibility of authoritative sources of law. They may also presup-
pose a position on the possible content of those sources. The Ninth
Amendment and the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges
or Immunities Clauses, for example, may allow morality to count
as an authoritative source of law. But most of the Constitution's
provisions concern the extent of the power of government over
people and the allocation of power between state and federal gov-
ernments and among the federal branches. Here, where the distri-
bution and extent of authority is in question, general considerations
about the authoritativeness of norms are unhelpful. They are un-
helpful because they do not restrict or even inform the allocation
or extent of legitimate lawmaking. What makes a norm a legal
13, See Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, supra note 44, at 764-66.
133 Id. at 765.
134 See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipres-
ence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L. 267,275 (1946).
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norm is one thing. Restrictions on the power of federal courts to
make common law is another matter, having to do only with law-
making authority. The latter is a question of institutional design and
political theory, not the nature of law. In these contexts, at least,
constitutional conclusions cannot be drawn from jurisprudential
premises about the nature of law.

